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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Steven D. Benjamin*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past year, the Court of Appeals of Virginia continued
to be the major contributor to the development of substantive and
procedural criminal law in the Commonwealth. Many of the court's
decisions concerned the characterization of. police-citizen en-
counters in the context of both Fourth Amendment law and the
rights of an accused under Miranda v. Arizona.1 A number of cases
concerned the admissibility of uncharged misconduct, and the nu-
merous double jeopardy opinions involved case-by-case application
of Grady v. Corbin,2 Blockburger v. United States,3 and related
statutes. A growing body of procedural law concerned the propri-
ety of impanelling jurors of dubious impartiality. Many of the
court's opinions illustrated deficiencies in the preservation of
presenting issues for appellate review.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Detentions and Arrests
A number of cases decided in 1992 involved the question of
whether a police-citizen encounter was a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.4 In Commonwealth v. Satchel,5 the Court of Appeals
of Virginia adopted a deferential standard of appellate review, dis-
cussing the circumstances to be considered in making the determi-
nation.' Relying on the holding in Baldwin v. Commonwealth,7 the
court reversed the circuit court, holding that the police officer did
* Steven D. Benjamin & Associates, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1976, East Carolina Uni-
versity; J.D., 1979, T.C. William School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
3. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
4. See, e.g., Carson v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 293, 421 S.E.2d 415 (1992), (affirming Car-
son v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 280, 410 S.E.2d 412 (1991); Grinton v. Commonwealth,
14 Va. App. 846, 419 S.E.2d 860 (1992) (a police-citizen encounter at a toll booth on Inter-
state 95 was consensual).
5. 15 Va. App. 127, 422 S.E.2d 412 (1992).
6. Id. at 131, 422 S.E.2d at 415.
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not seize the defendant when he approached Satchel, and asked
him first what he had in one hand, and then the other hand.8 The
court explained that despite its deferential standard of review, it
found no credible evidence in the record to support the trial
court's finding.9
What began as a consensual encounter became a seizure in
Payne v. Commonwealth.0 Despite the officer's request, the de-
fendant refused to open his fist. Thwarted and concerned, the of-
ficer grabbed Payne's wrist to pry open his hand. This contact
changed the nature of the confrontation. Because there existed no
objectively reasonable basis for suspecting the defendant to be
armed and dangerous, the search of his hand, which contained co-
caine, was unreasonable."
The question in Burgess v. Commonwealth 2 was whether the
duration of the detention altered the character of the investigative
seizure.'" The court of appeals held that the forty-minute delay
was of no consequence because the officer "diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel [his]
suspicion[] quickly.' 14
7. 243 Va. 191, 413 S.E.2d 645 (1992) (officer's shining floodlight on two men walking
away from his car and directing them to return and produce identification did not constitute
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment).
8. The defendant had walked away from the scene when the officer had arrived, and was
unsuccessfully trying to open the door of an apartment when the officer followed him onto
the porch of the apartment and asked "What's in your hand, pal?" Satchel, 15 Va. App. at
129, 422 S.E.2d at 413.
9. Id. at 132, 422 S.E.2d at 415. This opinion was the subject of a dissent which argued
that "a talismanic reference to Baldwin" should not supplant the trial court's factual deter-
mination of the coercive effect of the officer's conduct, and that the record supported the
court's finding. Id. at 134, 422 S.E.2d at 416 (Benton, J., dissenting). The reason for the
deference urged by the dissent was included in the Court's reasoning in Hogan v. Common-
wealth, 15 Va. App. 355, 365, 423 S.E.2d 841, 848 (1992): "The trial court heard the evi-
dence, observed the witnesses and concluded that the officers acted in good faith and with
sufficient reason." Id.
10. 14 Va. App. 86, 414 S.E.2d 869 (1992).
11. Id. at 89-90, 414 S.E.2d at 870-71. See Bolda v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 315, 317-
18, 423 S.E.2d 204, 206 (1992) for a review of Virginia cases in which it was considered
reasonable for officers to have believed that an unidentified object encountered during a
frisk might be a weapon, justifying removal. See also Nesbit v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App.
391, 424 S.E.2d 239 (1992).
12. 14 Va. App 1018, 421 S.E.2d 664 (1992).
13. The defendant contended that his forty-minute detention constituted a full custodial
arrest without probable cause. Id. at 1021, 421 S.E.2d at 665-66.
14. Id. at 1022, 421 S.E.2d at 666 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686
(1985)).
752
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
The announcement of official authority and the command to the
defendant to do as instructed by a police officer effected a deten-
tion within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 15 An investiga-
tory detention, based on an anonymous tip, was approved in
Quigley v. Commonwealth.16 In Hatcher v. Commonwealth,17 the
court held officers had a reasonable suspicion justifying the deten-
tion where they observed the defendant get out of a car, which had
engaged in high speed evasive maneuvers, and walk quickly away
although the defendant was not the driver. 8 In Layne v. Common-
wealth" the fact that the basis for the investigatory detention was
a misdemeanor committed in another jurisdiction, and: not in the
officer's presence, did not defeat the propriety of the detention.
In Riley v. Commonwealth,0 the police officer saw the defendant
exit his car, turn his back to the officer, make a motion toward his
waistband, and then begin to walk away. The officer saw no object,
but believed that the defendant was trying to hide a weapon. He
followed the defendant in his police car, shining a bright light on
him. The defendant turned to face the car, but when the officer got
out to walk toward the defendant, he began to walk away. The of-
ficer identified himself and told the defendant to stop. During the
subsequent pat-down, the officer found cocaine in Riley's pocket.
Riley was charged and convicted despite his objection that his de-
tention and the frisk were unlawful.21
The court of appeals agreed with the defendant, finding that the
officer had no particularized knowledge of the defendant's involve-
ment in criminal activity. His presence in a high crime area was
15. Woodson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 787, 421 S.E.2d 1 (1992).
16. 14 Va. App. 28, 32, 414 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1992). See also Harmon v. Commonwealth, 15
Va. App. 440, 425 S.E.2d 77 (1992) (concerning investigative detentions).
17. 14 Va. App. 487, 419 S.E.2d 256 (1992).
18. Interestingly, the detention was not justified under the more stringent requirement of
the code. The code grants authority to an officer to detain a person only if he "reasonably
suspects" that the person "is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or
possesses a concealed weapon." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83 (Repl. Vol. 1990). The court's hold-
ing on this issue raised the question of whether suppression was the proper remedy for
violating a state procedural statute. The court found that excluding the evidence was not
required for this type of breach because the defendant was not deprived of his constitu-
tional rights. Hatcher, 14 Va. App. at 493, 419 S.E.2d at 259. Accord Penn v. Common-
wealth, 244 Va. 218, 420 S.E.2d 713 (1992), affirm'g Penn v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App.
399, 412 S.E.2d 189 (1991). Cf. Turner v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 737, 748 n.3, 420
S.E.2d 235, 242 n.3 (1992).
19. 15 Va. App. 23, 421 S.E.2d 215 (1992).
20. 13 Va. App. 494, 412 S.E.2d 724 (1992).
21. Riley, 13 Va. App. at 496, 412 S.E.2d, at 725.
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insufficient to impute wrongdoing or to color his conduct as
criminal.22
B. Consent
The standard for measuring the scope of an individual's consent
to a search is that of "objective reasonableness - what the typical
reasonable person [would] have understood by the exchange be-
tween the officer and the suspect. ' 23 The scope of an individual's
consent to search arose in Bolda v. Commonwealth.24 The officer in
Bolda asked the defendant whether he possessed any weapons.
When Bolda answered that he did not, the officer asked if he could
search his person. The court of appeals held that the officer's con-
clusion that Bolda's assent constituted consent to a general search
was objectively unreasonable.25
C. Search Warrants
Code of Virginia section 19.2-56 extinguishes "absolutely" the
validity of a search warrant which is not executed within fifteen
days from the date it is issued.26 In Turner v. Commonwealth,27
the defendant had argued that the passage of eleven days between
issuance and execution violated the requirement of Code of Vir-
ginia section 19.2-56 that a warrant be executed "forthwith." The
court of appeals disagreed, noting that the requirement was only
directory, and that the standard it promulgated was meant to be
both flexible and practical. Accordingly, "forthwith" was defined to
direct the execution of a search warrant "with reasonable dispatch
and without undue delay . . . as soon as reasonably practicable
under the circumstances. '2 8 In Turner, the police complied with
this requirement. The search warrant identified a person and an
22. Id. at 498-99, 412 S.E.2d at 726. Cf. Nesbit v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 391, 424
S.E.2d 239 (1992).
23. Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-04 (1991) ("The scope of a search is generally
defined by its expressed objective."). Id. at 1804.
24. 15 Va. App. 315, 423 S.E.2d 204 (1992).
25. The officer's search was limited to weapons and therefore the officer's removing and
opening a bag in Bolda's pocket was inappropriate. Id. at 319, 423 S.E.2d at 207. By con-
trast, the consent to search in Grinton v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 846, 419 S.E.2d 860
(1992) was a general consent which, without limitation, permitted the officer to search
closed containers found in the defendant's car.
26. V&. CODE ANN. § 19.2-56 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
27. 14 Va. App 737, 420 S.E.2d 235 (1992).
28. Id. at 743, 420 S.E.2d at 239.
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address. The officers made six trips to the address during the
eleven-day period, without executing the warrant, before finding
the individual present. It was not unreasonable for them to delay
execution until they learned that he arrived.29
A search warrant was properly executed in Commonwealth v.
Viar,30 where the court of appeals found that the "knock and an-
nounce" rule was inapplicable. The trial court erred in Common-
wealth v. Moss3 l in ruling that a search warrant became stale after
five days passed from the date of issuance. The record disclosed no
basis for this conclusion. Probable cause continued to exist and the
delay did not violate the "forthwith" requirement of Code of Vir-
ginia section 19.2-56.32
D. Miscellaneous
In Mier v. Commonwealth,3 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
suggested the possible characterization of a private security guard
as an agent of the police. 4 In Mills v. Commonwealth, 5 the court
accorded surprising deference to the trial court's finding that a
friend and informant of the sheriff was not acting as an agent of
the Commonwealth. The opinion discusses the factors the trial
court should evaluate to make this factual determination."
The Court of Appeals of Virginia considered various other
Fourth Amendment issues in 1992. It held that there is no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in airspace, and hence, a reasonable and
,articulable suspicion is not necessary before police may use a drug
dog to sniff around an item believed to contain drugs.3 7 The
Fourth Amendment only prohibits the Commonwealth or its
agents from conducting an unreasonable search, and there is no
state action where a private citizen installs a phone trap. 8 The
search warrant in Morke v. Commonwealth was valid because it
described the items sought with sufficient particularity and the of-
29. Id. at 747, 420 S.E.2d at 241.
30. 15 Va. App. 490, 425 S.E.2d 86 (1992).
31. 14 Va. App. 750, 420 S.E.2d 242 (1992).
32. Id. at 752, 420 S.E.2d at 243.
33. 12 Va. App. 827, 407 S.E.2d 342 (1991).
34. Id. at 833 n.1, 407 S.E.2d at 346 n.1.
35. 14 Va. App. 459, 418 S.E.2d 718 (1992).
36. Id. at 464, 418 S.E.2d at 720.
37. Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 1, 421 S.E.2d 877 (1992) (en banc).
38. Morke v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 496, 502-03, 419 S.E.2d 410, 414 (1992).
1993]
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ficers did not exceed the scope of the warrant's authorization."9 Po-
lice-created exigencies were discussed in Quigley v.
Commonwealth.40
Closed containers were lawfully searched in Hogan v. Common-
wealth.41 The appellate court did not accept the defendant's argu-
ment that the search was made in bad faith, as a pretext to a drug
investigation. Instead, the court deferred to the trial court, which
"heard the evidence, observed the witnesses and concluded that
the officers acted in good faith and with sufficient reason."42 Nev-
ertheless, the court's language left open the availability of a bad
faith argument, noting that nothing in the record established that
there was any motive, other than concern for personal safety,
prompting the search or that impounding the car or the inventory
search was made in bad faith.43
III. FIFTH AMENDMENT
Although routine traffic stops and questioning usually do not
amount to custodial interrogation,44 there is no per se rule to this
effect.45 In Cherry v. Commonwealth,46 a police officer stopped the
defendant on u tip that he had cocaine in his car. The officer told
Cherry that he had been stopped as part of a narcotics investiga-
tion. The fact that Cherry had been told the nature of the investi-
gation was a relevant consideration to the determination of cus-
tody. The defendant under these circumstances would not
reasonably have expected only a brief detention, accompanied by a
license and registration check, related questions, and then the free-
dom to leave. Although the detention was not a routine traffic stop,
what occurred was not necessarily custodial interrogation.
The next step in the court's analysis was an objective considera-
tion of the circumstances of the defendant's detention.47 In this
39. Id. at 502, 419 S.E.2d at 414.
40. 14 Va. App. 28, 38-41, 414 S.E.2d 85, 857-58 (1992).
41. 15 Va. App. 355, 423 S.E.2d 841 (1992).
42. Id. at 365, 423 S.E.2d at 848. Cf. Satchel v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 127, 422
S.E.2d 412 (1992).
43. Id. at 364, 423 S.E.2d at 847.
44. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). Routine traffic stops characteristically
involve brief detentions at the roadside by one or two officers under circumstances in which
the driver does not feel "completely at the mercy of the police." Cherry v. Commonwealth,
14 Va. App. 135, 138-39, 415 S.E.2d 242, 243-44 (1992).
45. Cherry, 14 Va. App. at 139, 415 S.E.2d at 242.
46. Id. at 135, 415 S.E.2d at 242.
47. See Wass v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27, 33, 359 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1987).
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case, the two police officers possessed the legal justification neces-
sary to make an investigative detention of Cherry. They asked him
to step out of his vehicle, but did not place him under formal ar-
rest or restrain him in any fashion. The detention occurred in a
public setting, Cherry was permitted to comfort his daughter, a
passenger in the car, and had been detained only briefly when the
officer asked the question which drew the Miranda objection. In
view of these factors, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
determination that Cherry was not in custody at the time the
question was posed.48
The Court of Appeals of Virginia accorded no deference to the
trial court's finding in Commonwealth v. Milner,49 reversing the
court's determination that the defendant had been subjected to
custodial interrogation without the benefit of the Miranda warn-
ings. Despite the fact that the defendant was not free to leave, and
was searched for weapons, the officer's actions "did not subject the
defendant to a restraint on freedom of movement 'of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.' "5 Similarly, in Hatcher v. Com-
monwealth,51 the defendant was not considered to have been sub-
jected to custodial interrogation where the officer commanded him
to stop, picked up a "stem" and asked to whom it belonged.52
Cases involving the putative waiver of constitutional rights
prompt a strained deference to trial court findings.5 3 Waivers in
hospital settings are particularly problematic. 4 In Williams v.
48. Cherry, 14 Va. App. at 141-42, 415 S.E.2d at 245.
49. 13 Va. App. 556, 413 S.E.2d 352 (1992).
50. Id. at 559, 413 S.E.2d at 354.
51. 14 Va. App 487, 419 S.E.2d 256 (1992).
52. Id. at 488, 419 S.E.2d at 257. The court of appeals considered that the encounter
occurred in a neutral setting on a public street, and involved a lone police officer addressing
a group of four men, with no actual physical restraint. The challenged interrogation con-
sisted of only one question, to which the defendant did not respond. The Miranda objection
arose because after the defendant was arrested and cuffed, and while he was being trans-
ported to the police station, he made an incriminating statement that was allegedly in re-
sponse to the unanswered question asked on the scene. This argument was rejected because
the statement was deemed an initiation of conversation by the defendant. Id. at 495, 419
S.E.2d at 261.
53. See, e.g., Mundy v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 461, 390 S.E.2d 525 (1990). But see
Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 423 S.E.2d 160 (1992).
54. See, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 208, 415 S.E.2d 856 (1991); Venable
v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 358, 404 S.E.2d 374,(1991). But see Commonwealth v. Peter-
son, 15 Va. App. 486, 424 S.E.2d 722 (1992), where the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's finding that asserting police authority when the defendant was "especially suscepti-
ble overbore his will," and rendered his statements involuntary. Id. at 488, 424 S.E.2d at
724.
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Commonwealth,55 the defendant was advised of his Miranda warn-
ings at the hospital. He voluntarily waived his rights58 and then
verbally abused the sheriff, for which he was arrested. At the police
station he was questioned without the benefit of additional warn-
ings. His earlier waiver, the efficacy of which was unaltered by his
conduct, was presumed to have continued. The abuse of the sheriff
was not an expression of the defendant's intent to revoke his prior
waiver.57
In Mills v. Commonwealth,5 the defendant was charged with
killing a Lee County sheriff's deputy. At a suppression hearing,
both he and a deputy testified that he had requested counsel after
being advised of his Miranda rights. An FBI agent testified that
the defendant said "I don't know if I could talk about that without
an attorney. 59 Other law enforcement agents testified that the de-
fendant made no request for counsel. The trial court resolved the
conflict, finding that the defendant did not request counsel, and
that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Re-
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Common-
wealth, the prevailing party, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court, finding that the holding was supported by credible
evidence.60
Determining whether a confession is voluntary is a question of
law which will be independently reviewed by an appellate court
considering the totality of the circumstances. 1 On the other hand,
the question of whether a waiver of Miranda rights was made
knowingly and intelligently is a question of fact on which a trial
court's finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness. 2
The strange events which occur in hospital settings are not confined to rights waivers. In a
Richmond emergency room, the curtain separating two hospital beds was pulled aside, per-
mitting the inadverent observation (and identification) of the defendant by his shooting
victim (and return attacker). The efforts of the Commonwealth to compel the surgical re-
moval of the victim's bullet from the defendant unsuccessfully culminated in Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
55. 14 Va. App. 208, 415 S.E.2d 856 (1992).
56. The opinion does not indicate whether the waiver was express or imputed.
57. Id. at 210, 415 S.E.2d at 858.
58. 14 Va. App. 459, 418 S.E.2d 718 (1992).
59. Id. at 467, 418 S.E.2d at 722.
60. Id. at 469, 418 S.E.2d at 723-24. See also Bolding v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 320,
423 S.E.2d 212 (1992) (holding that the defendant did not invoke his right to counsel when
he asked whether a lawyer could be appointed at that moment).
61. Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 580, 423 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1992).
62. Id. at 581, 423 S.E.2d at 163.
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In Harrison v. Commonwealth," the defendant remained silent
after he was advised of his Miranda rights. The Supreme Court of
Virginia agreed that a waiver could not be presumed from silence,
but assumed for the purpose of its opinion that the silence was an
implicit invocation of those rights." The defendant later asked the
officers what would happen to him. The officers told him that they
wanted his cooperation against his codefendants, and that his as-
sistance could help him. The defendant gave a complete statement,
and the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a waiver of his rights
was implicit in the giving of the statement.6 5 Although the defend-
ant was "visibly depressed" when he reopened his dialogue with
the police, his distress did not amount to a state of mental incom-
petence or insanity which would dictate a finding of involuntari-
ness. The court found no indication that the defendant's waiver
was coerced by the officers. 6
Three cases in 1992 concerned the scope of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Code of Virginia section 19.2-27067 confers "use" immunity,
a protection that is not co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, it cannot be used to
overcome the assertion of this privilege by a witness during cross-
examination."'
The appellate standard of review of a court's finding in a Kasti-
gar"° hearing is "clearly erroneous and not supported by the evi-
dence. ' 70 In Welsh v. Commonwealth7 1 the defendant was granted
immunity and compelled to testify in federal grand jury and trial
proceedings. The defendant argued that the Commonwealth failed
to prove that his immunized testimony was not used to indict or
prosecute him. The court of appeals affirmed the court's Kastigar
finding, weighing the precautions taken by Virginia authorities to
63. Id. at 576, 423 S.E.2d at 160.
64. Id. at 582, 423 S.E.2d at 163-64.
65. Id. at 582, 423 S.E.2d at 163.
66. The decision is significant because the supreme court recognized that "the methods
used to induce a waiver of Miranda rights, like those used to induce a confession, may
sometimes constitute coercive police activity." Id. at 583, 423 S.E.2d at 164.
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
68. Gosling v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 158, 415 S.E.2d 870 (1992).
69. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
70. Welsh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 300, 308, 416 S.E.2d 451, 456 (1992).
71. Id. at 300, 416 S.E.2d at 451.
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avoid exposure to the immunized testimony, and the independent
sources of the Commonwealth's case.72
The remedy for a breach of a cooperation/immunity agreement
by the government is left to the discretion of the trial court, and
may include the dismissal of the indictment or the suppression of
the evidence obtained as a result of the agreement. 3 In Common-
wealth v. Sluss, 74 the Commonwealth failed to show that the de-
fendant had violated the conditions of the immunity agreement.
The representation by the Commonwealth that a breach had oc-
curred was not sufficient, and was supported by no evidence. Be-
cause the Commonwealth failed to prove that the defendant had
breached the agreement, he was entitled to immunity. Thus, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the suppression
of the statements given by the defendant to the Commonwealth's
agents. 5
A defendant who pleads guilty waives his right against compul-
sory self-incrimination with respect to matters germane to the of-
fense. The trial court in Edmunson v. Commonwealth,"5 did not
err by requiring the defendant to answer questions regarding his
statements to probation officers. Unlike the invocation of the Fifth
Amendment Miranda right to counsel, the assertion of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is charge-specific. The invocation of
that right with respect to one charge does not bar police interroga-
tion of an uncounseled defendant with respect to an unrelated
charge.77
Other cases decided during the past year concerned questions
raised by police interrogation. The victim in Wilson v. Common-
wealth,7" was unable to identify the defendant. Hoping to elicit a
confession, a police detective lied to the defendant by telling him
that he had been positively identified by the victim. Although the
72. Id. at 308-10, 416 S.E.2d at 456-57. The defendant cited a number of specific in-
stances of taint, which the appellate court characterized as creating only "an abstract possi-
bility of taint," which the Commonwealth was not required to negate. Id. at 311, 416 S.E.2d
at 458. The Commonwealth need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
immunized testimony was not used and that the evidence which was admitted was derived
solely from independent sources. Id. at 312, 416 S.E.2d at 458.
73. Commonwealth v. Sluss, 14 Va. App. 601, 606, 419 S.E.2d 263, 266 (1992).
74. Id. at 601, 419 S.E.2d at 263.
75. Id. at 607, 419 S.E.2d at 267.
76. 13 Va. App. 476, 412 S.E.2d 727 (1992).
77. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 414, 417 S.E.2d 5 (1992).
78. 13 Va. App. 549, 413 S.E.2d 655 (1992).
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appellate court did not condone the conduct of the detective in
tricking the defendant, the misrepresentation did not render the
confession involuntary. 9
In Varher v. Commonwealth,"0 the defendant's act of nodding
his head during interrogation did not constitute a confession."1 It
was a "non-verbal expression" that may have indicated only an
"acknowledgment or understanding of the information being con-
veyed." '82 Also, by stating that he had "really messed up" after be-
ing confronted with the officer's suspicions, the defendant "may
have been acknowledging guilt of this offense or another offense
being investigated, or he may have merely been expressing his con-
cern for having placed himself in a compromising position. 83
Other meanings could just as reasonably have been attributed. 4
IV. DuE PROCESS
Due process challenges to eyewitness identifications question
whether an identification procedure is unduly suggestive and
whether the resulting in-court identification is reliable. 5 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia has shown no hesitancy in scrutiniz-
ing trial court findings of reliability.8 6 In Smallwood v. Common-
wealth,87 not only was the witness's identification unreliable, the
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction without the
identification. 8
The defendant in Palmer v. Commonwealth,89 refused to appear
in a physical lineup. His failure to comply with a court order was
79. Id. at 554-55, 413 S.E.2d at 658. See also Hall v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App 65, 72,
415 S.E.2d 439, 443 (1992).
80. 14 Va. App. 445, 417 S.E.2d 7 (1992).
81. Id. at 448, 417 S.E.2d at 8.
82. Id.
83. Id., 417 S.E.2d at 9.
84. Id.
85. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
86. See, e.g., Curtis v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 28, 396 S.E.2d 386 (1990); Wise v.
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197 (1988).
87. 14 Va. App. 527, 418 S.E.2d 567 (1992).
88. The court of appeals noted that due process required "more than simply a trial rit-
ual." Id. at 533, 418 S.E.2d at 570. But cf. Doan v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 87, 422
S.E.2d 398 (1992) (holding pretrial identification was not caused by unduly suggestive iden-
tification procedure); Palmer v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 346, 416 S.E.2d 52 (1992)
(holding evidence of eyewitness identification was sufficient).
89. 14 Va. App. 346, 416 S.E.2d 52 (1992).
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properly admitted at his trial, demonstrating consciousness of
guilt.90
A recurring issue in criminal litigation is the admissibility of un-
charged or other misconduct evidence. Generally this evidence is
considered irrelevant if the sole purpose is to establish criminal
propensity or bad character, or if its prejudicial effect outweighs its
probative value. The prosecutorial art has been to argue that the
evidence is admissible for one of the many valid reasons which ex-
ist as exceptions to this general rule.
During the defendant's trial for robbery in Parker v. Common-
wealth, 1 evidence was presented that the car in which he had es-
caped (and in which his fingerprints were found) had been stolen.
The court of appeals found no error in the admission of this evi-
dence, as the fact that the car was stolen corroborated the Com-
monwealth's theory that the car was used to escape from the bank.
Further, there was no evidence that the defendant had stolen the
car, so there was little or no prejudice to the defendant.9 2 Simi-
larly, there was no error in Witt v. Commonwealth,3 in permitting
audio tapes which showed evidence of other crimes to demonstrate
the defendant's knowledge of how to dismantle alarm systems. Any
prejudice was outweighed by the legitimate probative value of the
evidence.9 4
The trial court in LaForce v. Commonwealth,9 5 found that evi-
dence of the defendant's prior misconduct was relevant to the
crime charged because it showed intent and guilty knowledge, and
negated the defense of good faith or innocent bystander.9 The
trial court instructed the jury that it could not consider the evi-
dence as establishing criminal character or disposition, but only to
establish motive, intent or knowledge. The court of appeals dis-
agreed with the trial court's findings, holding that the evidence was
not probative of the issues for which it was admitted.9 7 The in-
struction did not cure the error for this same reason.8
90. Id. at 348, 416 S.E.2d at 53. His argument that the admission of this evidence consti-
tuted comment on his failure to testify was not discussed by the court.
91. 14 Va. App. 592, 421 S.E.2d 450 (1992).
92. Id. at 594, 421 S.E.2d at 452.
93. 15 Va. App. 215, 422 S.E.2d 465 (1992).
94. Id. at 221, 422 S.E.2d at 469.
95. 14 Va. App. 588, 419 S.E.2d 261 (1992).
96. Id. at 590, 419 S.E.2d at 262.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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Rebuttal evidence of conduct similar to what the defendant
claimed was an accident should not have been admitted in Knick
v. Commonwealth.99 Crucial to this holding was the lack of similar-
ity of outcome, and the appellate court's conclusion that the evi-
dence was logically relevant only to the defendant's propensity for
violence. 1°0 As in LaForce, °10 a limiting instruction could not have
cured the error, which was found to be not harmless. 10 2
In White v. Commonwealth,10 3 the court of appeals had held
that the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to sum-
marize the confession of a confederate rather than admitting the
confession in its entirety.1 0 4 In Lemons v. Commonwealth,0 5 a dif-
ferent result was obtained from the initial panel of the appellate
court where defense counsel sought to introduce the entire text of
a witness' statement instead of a summary of the exculpatory por-
tion.106 Upon rehearing en banc,10 7 the court held that its opinion
in White controlled. It vacated the convictions, remanded the case
to the trial court for its in-camera examination and inclusion in the
record of the verbatim statement. It further ordered the trial court
to determinate the statement's materiality and assess whether full
disclosure would have produced a different outcome.108
Due process arguments were considered in connection with other
issues. In Robinson v. Commonwealth, °" the argument that "eve-
99. 15 Va. App. 103, 421 S.E.2d 479 (1992).
100. Id. at 105, 421 S.E.2d at 480-81.
101. 14 Va. App. 588, 419 S.E.2d 261 (1992).
102. Knick, 15 Va. App. at 105, 421 S.E.2d at 481. See also Nicholas v. Commonwealth,
15 Va. App. 188, 422 S.E.2d 790 (1992) in which the evidence that the defendant had fired
the same gun in a shooting 13 hours before had little probative value with respect to iden-
tity. The prejudice of proving prior misconduct by the defendant outweighed whatever pro-
bative value existed. The court of appeals noted that the jury may have been so inflamed
that it punished the defendant for both the charged and the uncharged acts. Id. at 193, 422
S.E.2d at 794.
103. 12 Va. App. 99, 402 S.E.2d 692, aff'd, 13 Va. App. 284, 410 S.E.2d 412 (1991) (en
banc).
104. White, 12 Va. App. at 102, 402 S.E.2d at 694.
105. 13 Va. App. 668, 414 S.E.2d 842 (1992).
106. The panel held that the trial court did not err in not ordering full production, noting
that counsel was free to interview the witnesses and that the trial court had expressed a
willingness to reconsider its ruling if the witnesses refused to be interviewed. More impor-
tantly, the appellate court was unconvinced that a reasonable probability existed that had
the verbatim statement been produced, a different result as to punishment or guilt would
have resulted. Id. at 671, 414 S.E.2d at 844.
107. Lemons v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 1009, 420 S.E.2d 525 (1992).
108. Id. at 1009-10, 420 S.E.2d at 526.
109. 14 Va. App. 91, 414 S.E.2d 866 (1992).
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rything [the defendant] said today is the first time," was not a
comment on the defendant's post-arrest silence which so infected
the trial with unfairness as to deny due process. 1 0 The loss of po-
tentially exculpatory photographs was not a denial of due process,
absent a showing of bad faith by the police."' The trial court erred
where it found the defendant not guilty of the charged offense, but
at the same time, revoked a previously suspended sentence without
notice of a revocation hearing, an opportunity to be heard or pre-
sent evidence, or to obtain new counsel. 112 Statutory vagueness was
discussed in Welsh v. Commonwealth,"" as was the critical impor-
tance of a transfer hearing to a juvenile defendant," 4 for whom
fundamental fairness required appointing a mental health expert
of his own choosing."15
V. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Sixth Amendment's prohibition of double jeopardy protects
defendants against multiple punishments and multiple prosecu-
tions for the same offense."' In Grady v. Corbin,"7 the United
States Supreme Court held that a subsequent prosecution is
barred by the double jeopardy clause if the government seeks to
"establish an essential element" of the instant prosecution by
proving conduct which constitutes an offense for which the defend-
ant has been previously prosecuted." 8 This protection only ex-
110. Id. at 93, 414 S.E.2d at 867.
111. Williams v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 208, 210, 415 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1992).
112. Copeland v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 754, 756, 419 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1992).
113. 14 Va. App. 300, 317-18, 416 S.E.2d 451, 461 (1992). See also Parnell v. Common-
wealth, 15 Va. App. 342, 342, 423 S.E.2d 837, 838 (1992) (barring defendant from raising
vagueness for the first time on appeal).
114. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 226, 421 S.E.2d 900 (1992).
115. Id. at 229, 421 S.E.2d at 901-02. The defendant's mental condition was material to
the transfer determination. The Commonwealth appealed the juvenile and domestic rela-
tions court's decision not to transfer the case and asked that a particular psychologist be
appointed to evaluate the defendant. The order appointing the requested expert provided
that he should "where appropriate ... assist in the development of an insanity defense."
Id. at 230, 421 S.E.2d at 902. Nevertheless, the appellate court noted that the defendant's
perception of the expert's neutrality was certainly affected by the Commonwealth's specific
request. Id. at 230, 421 S.E.2d at 902.
116. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
117. 475 U.S. 508 (1990).
118. Id. at 521. See, e.g., Clayton Motors v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 470, 417 S.E.2d
317 (1992). In Clayton Motors, the defendant was prosecuted for both robbery and the
lesser included offense of larceny. Because the same theft was the subject of the two
charges, the double jeopardy prohibition barred convictions for both charges and the lesser
included charge was dismissed. Id. at 470, 417 S.E.2d at 316.
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tends to successive prosecutions,119 and the various attempts of de-
fendants to invoke this protection by causing successive
proceedings have been of no avail.120
Where the convictions occur in a single prosecution, the protec-
tion against multiple punishment is applicable, and the test articu-
lated in Blockburger v. United States,'2' is determinative. In Sulli-
van v. Commonwealth,22 the defendant's conviction of one of two
robberies of two individuals was barred where there was only one
theft.' 23 The Blockburger test was satisfied in Johnson v. Com-
monwealth124 because the charges of assault and abduction require
proof of different facts. 25
Note that the burden is on the defendant to prove his allegations of prior jeopardy and
the identity of the offenses involved. This burden is customarily discharged by producing
the record or transcript of the earlier trial. Cooper v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 642, 644,
414 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1992).
119. See, e.g., Freeman v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 126, 414 S.E.2d 871 (1992) (hold-
ing that a prosecution for burglary is not barred because it was a concurrent, not successive,
prosecution with the charge of petit larceny, which was dismissed in the general district
court). The rule is also subject to a "jurisdictional exception," and does not apply when the
various crimes are not subject to a common jurisdiction. Curtis v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.
App. 622, 626, 414 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1992)(en banc).
120. See, e.g., Walker v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 203, 415 S.E.2d 446 (1992). The
defendant had pleaded guilty to robbery, and moved to quash the charge of malicious
wounding which arose out of the same set of circumstances. He argued that the two pro-
ceedings were successive prosecutions. The appellate court disagreed, noting that to hold
otherwise would permit the use of the double jeopardy clause by "other defendants... as a
sword." Id. at 205, 415 S.E.2d at 447. The court found that the defendant, not the govern-
ment, had caused the two proceedings to occur by his maneuvering. Id. at 205, 415 S.E.2d at
447. See also Rea v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 940, 421 S.E.2d 464 (1992)(defendant
arraigned simultaneously on charges of capital and first degree murder for the same homi-
cide pleaded guilty to the latter and sought, unsuccessfully, to invoke a double jeopardy
bar). Stevens v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 238, 415 S.E.2d 881 (1992)(prosecution for
conspiracy to commit murder was not precluded where defendant, upon arraignment for
that charge and malicious wounding, pled guilty to one and not guilty to the other.
121. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The traditional test is that the prosecution of two offenses aris-
ing from the same act is not barred if each offense requires the proof of an element which
the other does not. This is not the end of the inquiry. Even if the offenses are the same
under Blockburger, the question remains whether the General Assembly intended cumula-
tive punishments for the two offenses. Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725-26, 284
S.E.2d 796, 797 (1981).
122. 14 Va. App. 1044, 420 S.E.2d 724 (1992).
123. The court suggested that a clearer objection would have been that the evidence was
insufficient to establish the commission of a second robbery. Id. at 1047, 420 S.E.2d at 726.
124. 13 Va. App. 515, 412 S.E.2d 731 (1992).
125. The offense of assault required proof of an attempt or offer to do bodily harm, con-
duct not required by the offense of abduction, which required proof of an asportation or
detention by force, threat, or intimidation. Id. at 517, 412 S.E.2d at 732. The conduct in
Johnson which supported the assault conviction was different from the conduct which was
used to establish the corresponding element in the abduction charge. Id. at 517, 412 S.E.2d
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Code of Virginia section 19.2-294 bars multiple convictions for
crimes arising from the "same act." In Hall v. Commonwealth,12
the court of appeals held that the bar applies only to successive
prosecutions for the same act.127 The en banc reversal of the panel
decision in Lash v. Commonwealth1 2 held that convictions for
reckless driving and eluding a police officer were based on separate
acts and were not barred by the statutory prohibition.2 9
VI. TRIALS
As in the past several years, the number of cases raising ques-
tions of trial procedure remained unabated.
A. Jurors
Reasonable doubt with respect to whether a juror is qualified
must be resolved in the defendant's favor.1 30 A potential juror in
Moten v. Commonwealth' answered on voir dire that she could
"try" to keep an open mind, but was "not sure" if she could put
her personal feelings aside. To the trial court's suggestive question,
she agreed that she could "stand indifferent." Stating that "ex-
pected answers" and "mere assent" do not rehabilitate a prospec-
tive juror, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the juror
should have been excluded for cause.13 2
A defendant's conviction was reversed in Williams v. Common-
wealth,1 33 where several jurors should have been excluded for cause
even though they indicated that they thought they could give the
at 732. See also Phoung v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 457, 424 S.E.2d 712 (1992) (holding
abduction and robbery are distinct offenses).
126. 14 Va. App. 892, 421 S.E.2d 455 (1992)(en banc).
127. Id. at 894, 421 S.E.2d at 457. The court overruled the panel decision in Lash v.
Henrico County, holding that the section applied even where the convictions were obtained
in a single trial. Id. at 894, 421 S.E.2d at 457.
128. 14 Va. App. 926, 421 S.E.2d 851 (1992)(en bane).
129. Id. at 929, 421 S.E.2d at 853. See also Moore v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 198, 415
S.E.2d 247 (1992) (holding that a double jeopardy protection did not bar prosecution for the
offense of driving as an habitual offender even though the defendant had been convicted of
two other moving violations).
130. Moten v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 956, 959, 420 S.E.2d 250, 252 (1992) ("[u]sing
or permitting the use of leading questions ... in the voir dire of a prospective juror may
taint the reliability of the juror's responses"). Id. at 959, 420 S.E.2d at 252 (quoting from
McGill v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 237, 242, 391 S.E.2d 597, 600 (1990)).
131. 14 Va. App. 956, 420 S.E.2d 250 (1992).
132. Id. at 959, 420 S.E.2d at 252.
133. 14 Va. App. 208, 415 S.E.2d 856 (1992).
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defendant a fair trial.134 The opinion is significant for two reasons.
First, it contains an excellent discussion of when a juror can be
expected to sit impartially, including an explanation of how the
circumstances of each juror in this case created a reasonable doubt
that he could fairly perform his duties. Second, the information
considered by the appellate court in reviewing the trial court's ac-
tion was gained through a thorough voir dire distinct from the yes/
no and conclusory type examination to which practitioners have
been customarily confined. This case provides at least implicit au-
thority for more open-ended questions on voir dire.135
Other irregularities in the impaneling of jurors may cause rever-
sal. Code of Virginia section 19.2-262(2) provides that a jury in a
felony case shall consist of twelve persons drawn from a panel of
twenty.13 In Fuller v. Commonwealth,'37 the trial court erred in
impaneling a jury of twelve from a panel of eighteen, even though
the prosecutor waived two of his peremptory strikes.3 8 Striking a
juror does not cure the error in impaneling him, even if the juror is
struck by the Commonwealth after the defendant's motion to ex-
cuse is denied.13
Evidence was proffered in Witt v. Commonwealth"40 that during
the testimony of a witness for the Commonwealth, someone in the
audience made threatening gestures to the witness, and that such
gestures may have been seen by the jury. The trial court erred in
refusing to poll the jury.'41 The trial court was not required, how-
ever, to summon a juror to investigate misconduct where the affi-
davit in support of the motion made no allegation that the juror
received extrajudicial information. 42 Neither was a reasonable
doubt of impartiality established by evidence of startled glances
among the venire when they saw the defendant, who several of the
134. Id. at 214, 415 S.E.2d at 860. "In determining whether a juror is free from prejudice,
nothing should be left to inference or doubt." Id. at 213, 415 S.E.2d at 859.
135. Cf. McGann v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 448, 424 S.E.2d 706 (1992).
136. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262(2) (Cune. Supp. 1993).
137. 14 Va. App. 277, 416 S.E.2d 44 (1992).
138. Id. at 278, 416 S.E.2d at 44. The court of appeals approved the practice of waiving
strikes when necessary, unless a defendant insists on the statutory mandate. Id. at 281-82,
416 S.E.2d at 47.
139. Id. at 281, 416 S.E.2d at 46.
140. 15 Va. App. 215, 422 S.E.2d 465 (1992).
141. Id. at 225, 422 S.E.2d at 471.
142. Hall v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 65, 415 S.E.2d 439 (1992).
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prospective jurors had acquitted in an earlier trial, in the custody
of the sheriff as he was led into the courtroom. 143
Surprisingly little litigation arose over the application of Batson
v. Kentucky. 4 4
B. Speedy Trial
Code of Virginia section 19.2-243 provides for trial of criminal
cases within five or nine months, depending upon whether the de-
fendant is incarcerated. 145 It is the fact of incarceration which con-
trols, regardless of any connection of that incarceration to the in-
stant.offense. 146 The pretrial delay in Adkins v. Commonwealth147
was not explained by any order or docket entries in the record.
The testimony of a witness's recollection of the reason for the de-
lay was insufficient.141
C. Mistrials
The defendant in Kitze v. Commonwealth 49 had put on evi-
dence of irresistible impulse and pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity. During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury
that if it found the defendant not guilty, he would go free. The
defendant's motion for a mistrial was properly denied, and the er-
143. Fuller v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 277, 416 S.E.2d 44 (1992).
144. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). But see Winfield v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 1049, 421 S.E.2d
468 (1992) (en banc), where the appellate court lifted the stay of the panel's mandate in
Winfield v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 446, 404 S.E.2d 398 (1991), and affirmed the trial
court's finding of fact that the Commonwealth's Attorney satisfied the Batson requirements.
The Winfield court adopted the standard of review espoused by a plurality in Hernandez v.
New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991), where the trial court's decision on discriminatory intent is
a finding of fact which will not be overturned on appeal absent a determination that it was
clearly erroneous. The adoption of this standard, "without serious analysis," was the subject
of vehement dissent. Winfield, 14 Va. App. at 1065, 421 S.E.2d at 478 (Coleman, J.
dissenting).
145. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
146. Jones v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App 566, 569, 414 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1992). In this
case, the delay was properly attributable to the defendant's request for a psychiatric evalua-
tion and lack of cooperation. Id. at 570-71, 414 S.E.2d at 195-96. The defendant's Sixth
Amendment claim was discussed and rejected. Id. at 570-71, 414 S.E.2d at 195-96. See also
Williamson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 655, 414 S.E.2d 609 (1992) (holding no denial of
speedy trial rights under § 19.2-243, the Sixth Amendment, or the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers).
147. 13 Va. App. 519, 414 S.E.2d 188 (1992).
148. Id. at 522, 414 S.E.2d at 189.
149. 15 Va. App. 254, 422 S.E.2d 601 (1992), rev'd 1993 WL 356759, at *1 (Va. Sept. 17,
1993).
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ror was corrected by the trial court's instruction that the jury was
not to concern itself with what might happen after the verdict.
The prosecutor's repeated improper questions concerning the
defendant's involvement in unrelated drug transactions in Robin-
son v. Commonwealth,150 created a manifest probability that the
jury was prejudiced and the defendant was denied a fair trial.151 A
new trial was granted in another case where the defendant had
tried unsuccessfully to interview a friend of the rape victim, who
came forward after the trial with exculpatory information.152
C. Evidence
Many of the year's cases from the Court of Appeals of Virginia
concerned common evidentiary questions, particularly questions
related to authentication requirements, 153 hearsay, TM expert testi-mony,155 and relevance. 56
150. 13 Va. App. 574, 413 S.E.2d 885 (1992).
151. Id. at 575, 413 S.E.2d at 886. The court of appeals expressly declined to state
whether a retrial would be barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy, noting that its
remand of the case did not foreclose the question. Id. at 575 n.1, 413 S.E.2d at 886 n.1.
152. Gatling v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 60, 414 S.E.2d 862 (1992). Although the wit-
ness was present at trial on a Commonwealth's subpoena, he did not testify, and the defend-
ant was understandably reluctant to call him as a witness without knowing what he would
say. The court suggested a potential issue not pertinent to this case regarding the sufficiency
of a proffer to present evidence in support of a motion for a new trial. Id. at 61 n.1, 414
S.E.2d at 863 n.1.
153. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 407, 424 S.E.2d 566 (1992) (concerning video-
tape); Kitze v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 254, 422 S.E.2d 601 (1992) (concerning circum-
stantial authentication of a letter); Witt v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 215, 422 S.E.2d 465
(1992) (requiring foundation for admission of duplicate tapes from a body wire); Proctor v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 937, 419 S.E.2d 867 (1992) (copy of a certificate of laboratory
analysis was not properly authenticated); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 599, 414
S.E.2d 419 (1992) (carbon copy is not a "copy" within the meaning of VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
391(c) (Repl. Vol. 1992)); Riley v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 494, 412 S.E.2d 724 (1992)
(failing to object to the absence of proof of due execution waives the requirement of proof of
authenticity).
154. Neal v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 416, 425 S.E.2d 521 (1992) (concerning a search
warrant affidavit); Knick v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 103, 421 S.E.2d 479 (1992) (relating
to adoptive admission); Clark v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 1068, 421 S.E.2d 28 (1992)
(dealing with present sense impression); Hooker v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 454, 418
S.E.2d 343 (1992) (admitting hearsay improperly caused reversal).
155. Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 1, 413 S.E.2d 875 (1992); Papuchis v. Common-
wealth, 15 Va. App. 281, 422 S.E.2d 419 (1992) (expert relying on facts not in evidence to
develop an opinion); Knick v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 103, 421 S.E.2d 479 (1992) (ex-
pert's opinion that the evidence was consistent with the defendant's version of the events
was inadmissible opinion on the ultimate fact in issue); Schooler v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.
App. 418, 417 S.E.2d 110 (1992) (admitting opinion of accident reconstruction expert was
improper).
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In Mason v. Commonwealth,157 the Commonwealth had argued
that the defendant's proffered testimony was inadmissible because
it presented evidence in mitigation of punishment. Because the
testimony pertained to the defendant's motivation and state of
mind, it went to his culpability, and was admissible despite any
effect it may have had on his sentence. 158 The trial court in an-
other case erred by not admitting evidence that a victim had of-
fered to drop charges in exchange for money.159 The court of ap-
peals reasoned that the offer was probative of the victim's
perception of the incident, and that his perception was material as
it "necessarily influenced" his recounting of what occurred.'
The necessity of a Weimer' 6' analysis was created by defense ob-
jections to the cross-examination of the defendant's reputation
witness.0 2
A variety of other evidentiary issues were the subject of discus-
sion or holdings.'
156. Irving v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 178, 180, 422 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1992) (discuss-
ing logical and legal relevance) (Benton, J., dissenting); Evans v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.
App 118, 415 S.E.2d 851 (1992) (defining relevancy); Morris v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App.
283, 416 S.E.2d 462 (1992) (en banc) (photographs of the defendant and another individual
were relevant to prove acquaintance and did not depict the defendant engaged in any illegal
activity). But see Morris, 14 Va. App. at 288-89, 416 S.E.2d at 465 (Benton, J. dissenting);
Varker v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App 445, 417 S.E.2d 7 (1992) (discussing circumstantial
evidence).
157. 14 Va. App. 609, 419 S.E.2d 856 (1992).
158. Id. at 614, 419 S.E.2d at 860.
159. Turner v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 651, 653, 414 S.E.2d 437, 438 (1992).
160. Id.
161. Weimer v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 47, 360 S.E.2d 381 (1987).
162. Gravely v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 560, 414 S.E.2d 190 (1992). In addition to
making the determinations described in Weimer, the trial court should also inform the jury
of the limited purpose of evidence developed during such a cross. Id. at 563, 414 S.E.2d at
192.
163. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 407, 424 S.E.2d 566 (1992) (concerning unfair
emphasis); Rader v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 325, 423 S.E.2d 207 (1992) (concerning the
admissibility of building code violations to prove fraudulent intent); Doan v. Common-
wealth, 15 Va. App. 87, 422 S.E.2d 398 (1992) (relating to the admissibility of a transcript of
the previous testimony of a witness allegedly unavailable as an inmate within the Depart-
ment of Corrections); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 73, 422 S.E.2d 593 (1992)
(discussing the proper basis of inferences); Mostyn v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 920, 420
S.E.2d 519 (1992) (defendant's reputation for "not using drugs" was inadmissible); Archie v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 684, 420 S.E.2d 718 (1992) (concerning sodium amytal); Baugh
v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368, 417 S.E.2d 891 (1992) (relating to the admissibility of
district court's certificate of events in trial de novo of contempt conviction); Toro v. City of
Norfolk, 14 Va. App. 244, 416 S.E.2d 29 (1992) (survey results in obscenity prosecution were
not relevant where survey questions were inadequate); Hanson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.
App. 173, 416 S.E.2d 14 (1992) (postmark evidence is admissible to prove the date it was
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E. Instructions
A trial court has an affirmative duty to instruct a jury with re-
spect to a principle of law vital to the defense of an accused,' e" and
with respect to a lesser included offense.165 The rule in the latter
respect is that the instruction is required so long as a factual ele-
ment must be proved which is not required for the lesser offense. A
conflict in the evidence as to that element is not required."6 ' On
appeal, the standard of review on questions of refused instructions
requires a consideration of the evidence in the light most favorable
to the defendant.16 7
F. Sentencing
The opinions of the Court of Appeals of Virginia concerning sen-
tencing issues considered either the conditions of suspended peri-
ods of incarceration 6  or revocation of suspended sentences. 169
affixed); Hall v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 65, 415 S.E.2d 439 (1992) (evidence of a
friend's method of establishing a false alibi was too speculative and prejudicial to justify
admission in the defendant's murder trial); Scafetta v. Arlington County, 13 Va. App. 646,
414 S.E.2d 443 (1992) (requiring judicial notice of official publications of the United States
and its agencies); Simpson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 604, 414 S.E.2d 407 (1992) (col-
lateral evidence elicited during cross-examination is conclusive and an objection is not re-
quired to preserve right to object to attempt to rebut the collateral matter).
164. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 988, 421 S.E.2d 652 (1992) (en bane).
165. Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524, 414 S.E.2d 401 (1992) (en bane).
166. Id. at 528, 414 S.E.2d at 403. In Martin, the defendant's words and actions were not
disputed, but his specific intent was an issue. See also Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App.
130, 415 S.E.2d 250 (1992) (reversing conviction because of court's failure to instruct the jury
on the lesser-included offense).
167. Boone, 14 Va. App. at 131, 415 S.E.2d at 251. In Clay v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App.
617, 414 S.E.2d 432 (1992), the court of appeals suggested that some instructions may only
be offered by a particular party, apart from the question of whether evidence would support
the giving of the instruction. Id. at 621, 414 S.E.2d at 434.
168. Deal v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 157, 421 S.E.2d 897 (1992) (the restitution con-
dition of a suspended sentence was not excessive or improperly payable to a third party);
Bassett v, Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 580, 414 S.E.2d 419 (1992) (court's statement indi-
cating a blanket refusal to consider mitigating factors taken out of context); Robinson v.
Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 540, 413 S.E.2d 661 (1992) (guidelines are but a factor to be
used by the trial judge as he sees fit and the stated reasons for departure evinced no abuse
of discretion).
169. Connelly v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 888, 420 S.E.2d 244 (1992) (no abuse of
discretion in finding that the defendant failed to abide by the terms of his one year proba-
tion where he submitted a urine screen positive for marijuana); Preston v. Commonwealth,
14 Va. App. 731, 419 S.E.2d 288 (1992) (revocation improper where the only basis was a
misdemeanor conviction which had been appealed de novo); Bryce v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.
App. 589, 414 S.E.2d 417 (1992) (misrepresentating identity at the time of sentencing justi-
fied revocation of a suspended sentence).
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G. Miscellaneous
In Davis v. Commonwealth,70 the defendant's conviction was re-
versed where the Commonwealth failed to prove venue in a prose-
cution for receiving stolen property. No evidence linked the de-
fendant to the break-in, or proved that he bought or sold the
subject of the larceny in South Boston. The Commonwealth argued
that because larceny is a continuing offense, the defendant could
be tried in the county where the theft occurred. The Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia held that a defendant charged with receiving sto-
len goods must be tried in those jurisdictions in which he received
or possessed the stolen items.'17
The various circumstances and theories which mandate recusal
were discussed in Welsh v. Commonwealth.7 2 In Parrish v. Com-
monwealth,178 the trial court misapplied the plea agreement under
the terms of which the defendant had pleaded guilty to a reduced
charge of possession of cocaine. Upon his subsequent breach, the
trial court vacated the conviction and found the defendant guilty
of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The court erred
in taking this action because the breach occurred only with respect
to a condition of the suspended sentence. 17 4
A defendant is entitled to a trial by jury upon a plea of not
guilty, even though he intends to admit his guilt during his testi-
mony. 7 5 Ordering a defendant to shave his beard, cut his hair, and
participate in a lineup does not violate his First Amendment free-
dom of expression, if his appearance is one of personal preference,
and not for the purpose of expressing an idea. 76 The trial court in
Garrett v. Commonwealth 7 7 correctly refused to determine if sev-
eral robberies were part of a common scheme within the meaning
of Code of Virginia section 53.1-151(B)(1). In Clark v. Common-
wealth,7 18 the court's unnecessary interjection into the defendant's
argument, with no objection by the Commonwealth, was improper.
170. 14 Va. App. 709, 419 S.E.2d 285 (1992).
171. Id. at 714, 419 S.E.2d at 288.
172. 14 Va. App. 300, 416 S.E.2d 451 (1992).
173. 14 Va. App. 23, 415 S.E.2d 234 (1992).
174. Id. at 27, 415 S.E.2d at 236.
175. Mason v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 609, 419 S.E.2d 856 (1992).
176. Palmer v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 346, 416 S.E.2d 52 (1992).
177. 14 Va. App. 154, 415 S.E.2d 245 (1992).
178. 14 Va. App. 1068, 421 S.E.2d 28 (1992).
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The prosecutor's argument in Thurston v. City of Lynchburg'79
was improper. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
limitation of cross-examination in Smith v. Commonwealth.80
VII. APPEALS
A number of recent Court of Appeals of Virginia decisions illus-
trated the consequences of failing to preserve issues for appellate
review. These decisions chiefly concerned three problem areas: fail-
ing to make necessary filings within the time limits set by the
Rules; failing to object or move for specific relief; and failing to
object with the requisite specificity.
One consequence of the court's willingness to dismiss appeals
not properly presented has been the development of an area of ap-
pellate law pertaining to the perfection of appeals following habeas
corpus awards of belated appeals. Describing one recurrent prob-
lem,""' the court held that if a timely notice of appeal was filed on
direct appeal, but the appeal was dismissed for failure to perfect
the appeal, a subsequent notice of appeal need not be filed.18 2 If
the notice of appeal was not filed initially in a timely manner, it
must be so filed upon a grant of a belated appeal."8 3
Another troublesome area is created by a failure to present ap-
pellate review. 1 4 Where a statement of facts is used instead of a
transcript, it must be filed within fifty-five days. The "entry" of
the statement is insufficient, and local custom will not absolve a
litigant who does not adhere strictly to the Rules of Court. 8 5 How-
ever, a transcript or proffer is not always necessary. 186
179. 15 Va. App. 475, 424 S.E.2d 701 (1992).
180. 15 Va. App. 507, 425 S.E.2d 95 (1992).
181. Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 256, 260, 416 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1992).
182. Id. at 260, 416 S.E.2d at 708.
183. Id. at 260, 416 S.E.2d at 708. See also D'Allesandro v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App.
163, 423 S.E.2d 199 (1992) (dismissing appeal because notice was not timely filed).
D'Allesandro illustrates the importance of an order modifying, vacating, or suspending the
sentencing order within twenty-one days.
184. See McGann v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 448, 424 S.E.2d 706 (1992) (barring
review because defense counsel failed to proffer testimony expected to be adduced through
cross-examination).
185. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 506, 413 S.E.2d 75 (1992).
186. See, e.g., Craig v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 842, 419 S.E.2d 429 (1992) (proffer of
anticipated evidence was not necessary because the nature of the response to the prohibited
questions did not matter); Woodson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 787, 790-91, 421 S.E.2d
1, 3 (1992) (transcript of pretrial suppression hearing was unnecessary where trial transcript
was sufficient to resolve the issue).
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In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, the com-
plaining party must object and clearly state the relief sought.18 An
objection to improper argument is not sufficient unless the defend-
ant moves for a mistrial or a cautionary instruction,188 even if the
objection is overruled. 8 9 Litigants must state the nature of their
objection precisely, and must abandon efficient and customarily
understood short-form objections. The objection "to the hearsay"
in Buck v. Commonwealth,'9" was not sufficiently specific. In an-
other case, a panel of the court of appeals reversed, holding that
the use of a mug shot was prejudicial to the defendant's right to a
fair trial.191 En banc, the court affirmed the trial court, because the
"other crime" nature of the mug shot was objected to on relevancy
grounds and lacked the requisite specificity.1
9 2
Unlike error concerning the impaneling of an unqualified ju-
ror,193 other rulings are not reviewable if events at trial render
them moot. The claim of improper impeachment by prior convic-
tion which the trial court had ruled it would permit in Doan v.
Commonwealth 94 was not reviewed by the appellate court
because the defendant decided not to testify.
Some matters are preserved for review in a common sense man-
ner. The question of sufficiency of the evidence to support a con-
viction is preserved by counsel's arguing it in closing to the bench
in a trial without a jury. 95 In Martin v. Commonwealth,9 8 the de-
fendant was not required by Supreme Court of Virginia Rule
187. Parnell v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 342, 349, 423 S.E.2d 834, 838 (1992) (barring
review of challenge to the constitutionality of a statute because the issue must be raised first
in the trial court). See also Clark v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 1068, 1073, 421 S.E.2d 28,
31 (1992) (barring review, in the absence of an objection or motion for a mistrial, of defend-
ant's meritorious claim that the trial judge improperly interjected himself during counsel's
argument); Singleton v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 947, 419 S.E.2d 866 (1992) (dismissing
appeal because no objection or motion was made when a polled juror stated that she had a
reasonable doubt, but agreed with the verdict).
188. Moore v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 83, 414 S.E.2d 859 (1992).
189. Morris v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 283, 416 S.E.2d 462 (1992). See also Parker v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 592, 421 S.E.2d 450 (1992). In Parker, the defendant objected
to the fact that an alternate juror had been allowed to participate for some time in delibera-
tions. Although the objection was overruled, the question was not preserved for review be-
cause the defendant did not move for a mistrial. Id. at 286, 421 S.E.2d at 464.
190. 14 Va. App. 10, 15, 415 S.E.2d 229, 233 (1992).
191. Irving v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 414, 412 S.E.2d 712 (1991).
192. Irving v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 178, 422 S.E.2d 471 (1992)(en banc).
193. See supra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
194. 15 Va. App. 87, 422 S.E.2d 398 (1992).
195. Fortune v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 225, 416 S.E.2d 25 (1992). See also Harris v.
Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 593, 413 S.E.2d 354 (1992) (sufficiency issue was preserved
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5A:18 e7 to object to the court's refusal to give a defense instruc-
tion. The "ends of justice" exception to the Rule was applied in
Campbell v. Commonwealth.19
Three opinions contained implied caveats. Having asked the
trial court to find the defendant guilty of a misdemeanor instead of
a felony, the defendant could not sustain an appeal arguing that
the evidence was insufficient to support the misdemeanor convic-
tion which he had requested. 9 In Kitze v. Commonwealth, °" the
defendant conceded at trial that if his expert relied on a letter
from a prior attorney in evaluating the defendant, the letter was
admissible. The appellate court suggested that this statement of
the law was not accurate, but deemed it the "law of . . [the]
case."201 In Hubbard v. Commonwealth,20 2 the Supreme Court of
Virginia declined to reach the merits of an issue on appeal. The
court explained its application of the rule that "where an accused
unsuccessfully objects to evidence which he considers improper
and then on his own behalf introduces evidence of the same char-
acter, he thereby waives his objection. '20 3
The Commonwealth was successful in most of its en banc ap-
peals in the court of appeals,20 4 and a body of law has begun to
develop concerning these appeals. °3
where the motion to strike was made at the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, and in
final argument, but not at the close of the defendant's case).
196. 13 Va. App. 524, 414 S.E.2d 401 (1992).
197. VA. S. CT. R. 5A:18.
198. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 988, 421 S.E.2d 652 (1992)(en banc).
199. Manns v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 677, 414 S.E.2d 613 (1992).
200. 15 Va. App. 254, 422 S.E.2d 601 (1992).
201. Id. at 264, 422 S.E.2d at 607.
202. 243 Va. 1, 413 S.E.2d 875 (1992).
203. Id. at 9, 413 S.E.2d at 879.
204. See Commonwealth v. Satchell, 15 Va. App. 127, 422 S.E.2d 412 (1992) (concerning
interlocutory appeal). This case was remanded and tried, and is now on direct appeal with a
petition for appeal pending for consideration. See also Commonwealth v. Viar, 15 Va. App.
490, 425 S.E.2d 86 (1992); Commonwealth v. Moss, 14 Va. App. 750, 420 S.E.2d 242 (1992).
But see Commonwealth v. Peterson, 15 Va. App. 486,424 S.E.2d 722 (1992); Commonwealth
v. Sluss, 14 Va. App. 601, 419 S.E.2d 263 (1992).
205. See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 1, 421 S.E.2d 877 (1992) (en banc)
(petition for rehearing in the same appellate court is not an appeal prohibited by Art. VI,
Section I of the Virginia Constitution); Commonwealth v. Sluss, 14 Va. App. 601, 419 S.E.2d
263 (1992) (the court of appeals may affirm a correct ruling reached for the wrong reason if
the issue was before the court and the facts were resolved by the judge); Driscoll v. Com-
monwealth, 14 Va. App. 449, 417 S.E.2d 312 (1992) (an appellee is subject to Rule 5A:18
only when it asserts an error upon which it seeks to reverse a judgment).
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The Court of Appeals of Virginia continued to rely upon a di-
verse number of authorities in its opinions, including treatises, 06
dictionaries,0 7 journals,"' federal opinions,20 and, as it did twice
in 1991, the reasoning of a California court. 10 Certain sensitivities
and possible opportunities for argument were evident in several
opinions. The court had harsh language for a prosecutor's ac-
211tions, considered information not available through customarily
restricted voir dire,21 2 and considered a question asked by a delib-
erating jury to conclude that error was not harmless. 213 In at least
one case, the court's reasoning incorporated a defendant's particu-
larly repugnant attitude.2 14
VIII. CRIMES
A. Drugs
In Smith v. Commonwealth, 15 the Supreme Court of Virginia
ruled that the defendant's constant presence in an area notorious
206. E.g., WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE (2d ed. 1987), cited in Quigley v. Com-
monwealth, 14 Va. App. 28, 36 n.7, 414 S.E.2d 851, 855 (1992) (Benton, J., dissenting); JOHN
H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, (Tillers rev. 1983), cited in Hanson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App.
173, 416 S.E.2d 14 (1992). The most cited work is CHARLES E. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
IN 'VIRGINIA (3d ed. 1988).
207. E.g., BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990), cited in Claxton v. Commonwealth, 15
Va. App. 152, 154, 421 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1992); WEBsTE's 3D NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY, cited in Kitze v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 254, 262, 422 S.E.2d 601, 606 (1992)
(quoting Rollins v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 575, 580, 151 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1966).
208. E.g., Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Profes-
sionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427
(1980), cited in Archie v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 684, 693, 420 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1992).
209. See, e.g., Fuller v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 277, 280, 416 S.E.2d 44, 46 (1992)
(citing case from the Eighth Circuit); Toro v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va. App. 244, 249, 416
S.E.2d 29, 32 (1992) (citing case from the Fourth Circuit). See also Hatcher v. Common-
wealth, 14 Va. App. 487, 419 S.E.2d 256 (1992) (quoting portion of Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) which cited the results of a study concerning police officer
shootings).
210. See Dalton v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 544, 549, 418 S.E.2d 563, 566 (1992).
211. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 574, 577-79, 413 S.E.2d 885, 887-88 (1992).
212. Williams v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 208, 415 S.E.2d 856 (1992).
213. Hooker v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 454, 418 S.E.2d 343 (1992). Error was also
found not to be harmless in Papuchis v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 281, 422 S.E.2d 419
(1992) (concerning admission of hearsay), and Simpson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 604,
414 S.E.2d 407 (1992) (discussing impeachment of defendant).
214. See Gallimore v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 288, 422 S.E.2d 613 (1992), where a
police officer asked the defendant "[y]ou realize that this lie you told got an innocent man
killed?" The defendant replied, "So? - I didn't know the son-of-a-bitch." Id. at 293, 422
S.E.2d at 616.
215. 217 Va. 336, 228 S.E.2d 562 (1976).
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for drug trafficking had no relevance to his drug charge. Unlike the
defendant in Smith, the defendant in Brown v. Commonwealth216
possessed drugs at the time of his arrest and the Commonwealth's
attorney argued successfully that, under the circumstances, his
presence in a drug-prone area permitted the inference that he was
engaged in drug distribution. In Coe v. Commonwealth,217 similar
evidence was held to be relevant, because it corroborated abundant
evidence of guilt. What emerged from the reconciliation of previ-
ous decisions was the rule in Brown that evidence of a defendant's
connection to a "sinister location," in itself, is irrelevant. This evi-
dence becomes admissible when it is considered with other evi-
dence of illegal activity.218
A defendant's statement, in which he admitted to previous drug
purchases for resale, was admissible despite the fact that it con-
tained evidence of other misconduct.219 The evidence of prior con-
duct was probative of intent and was an inextricable part of the
statement.
22 1
In drug possession cases, ownership or occupancy of the prem-
ises within which drugs are found is insufficient, standing alone, to
prove a defendant's possession of those drugs.22' These factors are
considerations, however, and an inference that a transient would
not be likely to leave drugs of great value in a location not under
his dominion and control can be drawn from proof of a defendant's
ownership of premises where drugs are found.222 Other appellate
cases involving drugs concerned either the definition of terms or
the sufficiency of the evidence.223
216. 15 Va. App. 232, 421 S.E.2d 911 (1992).
217. 231 Va. 83, 86, 340 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1986).
218. Id. at 234, 421 S.E.2d at 912.
219. Satterfield v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 630, 420 S.E.2d 228 (1992).
220. Id. at 630, 420 S.E.2d at 228.
221. Burchette v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 432, 425 S.E.2d 81 (1992).
222. Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 1, 9, 421 S.E.2d 877, 883 (1992)(en banc). See
also Harmon v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 440, 446-47 (1992); Burchette, 15 Va. App. at
435, 425 S.E.2d at 81 (1992).
223. See Brooks v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 407, 424 S.E.2d 566 (1992); Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 337, 423 S.E.2d 371 (1992) (mere evidence of possessing money
insufficient to support conviction of attempt to distribute marijuana); Timmons v. Common-
wealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 421 S.E.2d 894 (1992) (instruction was too broad where it defined
"firearm" as "any object" appearing to have capability of firing a projectile); Hinton v. Com-
monwealth, 15 Va. App. 64, 421 S.E.2d 35 (1992) (testimony of a witness that she smoked
cocaine purchased from the defendant was not sufficient to prove that the substance was
cocaine absent other direct or circumstantial evidence); Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.
App. 1, 421 S.E.2d 877 (1992) (en banc) (evidence sufficient to prove intent to distribute,
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:751
B. Homicide
The Supreme Court of Virginia continued to affirm capital mur-
der convictions in 1992,224 and the Court of Appeals of Virginia
found the evidence to be sufficient in each of its homicide cases.225
In Gallimore v. Commonwealth,220 the evidence was sufficient to
show that the defendant acted with "reckless and utter disregard
for the life and personal safety of all the persons she had incited
by her deceit,"22 and that her actions formed a concurring, proxi-
mate cause of the victim's death.
The circumstantial factors which may be considered in deter-
mining whether a defendant formed a premeditated and specific
intent to kill were discussed in Archie v. Commonwealth.22 s
B. Burglary, Larceny, and Fraud
In Varker v. Commonwealth,229 the insufficient circumstantial
evidence of the defendant's guilt of burglary consisted of his latent
fingerprints at .the scene and his equivocal statements to the po-
lice. No "breaking" occurred in Doan v. Commonwealth,2 30 where
the defendant entered an open door and there was no evidence of a
constructive breaking. In Burgess v. Commonwealth, sl the defend-
ant's presence as a passenger in a car he knew was stolen was in-
sufficient to prove his guilt of its larceny.
and thorough discussion of sufficiency cases); Williams v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 666,
418 S.E.2d 346 (1992) (evidence insufficient to prove that the defendant fraudulently ob-
tained controlled substances); Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 77, 414 S.E.2d 860
(1992) (the Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant had ready access to either
item in order to prove simultaneous possession of a firearm and cocaine); Harris v. Com-
monwealth, 13 Va. App. 593, 413 S.E.2d 354 (1992) (where drugs were only found in defend-
ant's proximity, the evidence was insufficient to show constructive possession).
224. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 423 S.E.2d 360 (1992); Mueller v. Common-
wealth, 244 Va. 386, 422 S.E.2d 380 (1992); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 421
S.E.2d 821 (1992); Davidson v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 419 S.E.2d 656 (1992); Thomas
v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 419 S.E.2d 656 (1992).
225. See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 384, 424 S.E.2d 563 (1992) (concern-
ing felony murder); Hall v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 65, 415 S.E.2d 439 (1992).
226. 15 Va. App. 288, 422 S.E.2d 613 (1992).
227. Id. at 294, 422 S.E.2d at 616.
228. 14 Va. App. 684, 689, 420 S.E.2d 718, 721 (1992). Factors to be considered include
the following: the brutality of the attack; the disparity in size and strength between the
defendant and the victim; the defendant's lack of remorse; and the defendant's efforts to
avoid detection and motive. Id. at 689, 420 S.E.2d at 721.
229. 14 Va. App. 445, 417 S.E.2d 7 (1992).
230. 15 Va. App. 87, 422 S.E.2d 398 (1992).
231. 14 Va. App. 1018, 1023, 421 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1992).
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Payment due at a particular stage of construction does not in
itself prove that the payment is an advance for work to be com-
pleted or payment for work which has been performed.23 2 However,
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of
construction fraud in Rader v. Commonwealth.233 Similarly, the
very circumstantial evidence in Johnson v. Commonwealth234 was
sufficient to prove his guilt of burglary and larceny.3 5
An intent to defraud is an element of the crime of forgery of
public documents.23 6 The trial court's error in admitting hearsay to
prove the defendant's identity was not harmless in a prosecution
for petit larceny as a third or subsequent offense.2 37 What consti-
tutes a "storehouse" within the meaning of Code of Virginia sec-
tion 18.2_9023s was defined in Dalton v. Commonwealth.
23 9
C. Rape
In Evans v. Commonwealth,2 40 a rape prosecution, the court of
appeals held that the trial court erred in applying the rape shield
statute241 to exclude evidence that the victim had contracted a ve-
nereal disease, which the defendant had proffered to show a motive
to fabricate. The evidence was sufficient to prove attempted rape
in Fortune v. Commonwealth,242 but the dissent argued persua-
sively that the Commonwealth had failed to exclude the reasonable
hypothesis that the defendant was attempting to force the victim
to engage in oral sodomy, not intercourse.
243
232. Rader v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 325, 423 S.E.2d. 207 (1992).
233. Id. at 332, 423 S.E.2d at 212.
234. 15 Va. App. 73, 422 S.E.2d 593 (1992).
235. Id. at 77, 422 S.E.2d at 595. See also Welch v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 518, 425
S.E.2d 101 (1992) (evidence sufficient to fulfill asportation requirements in a retail setting);
Hanson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 173, 191, 416 S.E.2d 14, 25 (1992) (testimony re-
garding the value of pawned rings evidence sufficient to prove value in grand larceny
prosecution).
236. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 988, 990, 421 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1992).
237. Hooker v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 454, 418 S.E.2d 343 (1992).
238. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-90 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
239. 14 Va. App. 544, 548-49, 418 S.E.2d 563, 565 (1992).
240. 14 Va. App. 118, 415 S.E.2d 851 (1992).
241. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
242. 14 Va. App. 225, 416 S.E.2d 25 (1992).
243. Id. at 230, 416 S.E.2d at 28 (Moon, J., dissenting).
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D. Robbery
The defendant in Braxton v. Commonwealth244 had tried to fi-
nesse a robbery by telling the bank teller "I'm not going to hurt
you. I want to make a withdrawal." The evidence was sufficient to
sustain his conviction for attempted robbery.245
The fact that the theft of money in Clay v. Commonwealth246
was from the physical custody of a bank automatic teller machine
did not undermine the defendant's conviction of robbery.
E. Motor Vehicle Offenses
The traffic cases decided by the court of appeals primarily con-
cerned habitual offender charges247 and driving under the influence
of alcohol. 248 Actual notice of adjudication as a habitual offender is
an element of the offense of driving after having been declared an
habitual offender as defined by Code of Virginia section 46.2-
357.249 Breeden v. Commonwealth2 50 reversed a DUI conviction be-
cause the Commonwealth failed to establish that the blood test re-
quested by the defendant was unavailable. In Johnson v. Common-
wealth,251 the defendant's conviction of failing to stop at the scene
of an accident was affirmed even though the defendant and the
victim knew each other and were antagonists in a domestic dis-
pute.2 52 Nevertheless, in view of the rationale underlying the iden-
244. 13 Va. App. 585, 586, 414 S.E.2d 410, 411 (1992).
245. Id.
246. 13 Va. App. 617, 619, 414 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1992).
247. See Hall v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 170, 421 S.E.2d 887 (1992) (transcript of
DMV record, which included a copy of the habitual offender order, satisfied statutory au-
thentication requirements); Sos v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 862, 419 S.E.2d 426 (1992)
(driving on a revoked license was a proper predicate offense for declaring an habitual of-
fender); Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 449, 417 S.E.2d 312 (1992) (defendant was
properly adjudicated an habitual offender); Flaherty v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 148,
415 S.E.2d 867 (1992) (habitual offendbr proceeding imposes a forfeiture and the pertinent
statutes must be strictly construed against the Commonwealth); Sink v. Commonwealth, 13
Va. App. 544, 546-47, 413 S.E.2d 658, 659 (1992) (the Commonwealth has no discretion in
enforcing the Habitual Offender Act).
248. See Claxton v. City of Lynchburg, 15 Va. App. 152, 421 S.E.2d 891 (1992) (confession
of defendant combined with testimony of arresting officer as to his physical condition and
strong odor of alcohol evidence was sufficient for a DUI conviction); Hoambrecker v. Com-
monwealth, 13 Va. App. 511, 412 S.E.2d 729 (1992) (arrest within one mile of municipal
limits was proper, and circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support conviction).
249. Reed v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 467, 424 S.E.2d 718 (1992).
250. 15 Va. App. 148, 421 S.E.2d 674 (1992).
251. 14 Va. App. 769, 418 S.E.2d 729 (1992).
252. Id. at 772, 418 S.E.2d at 731.
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tification and assistance requirements of the statute, the evidence
was sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt of the offense.253
F. Miscellaneous
The language "totally and permanently disabled" in the mali-
cious wounding provision of the Code of Virginia section 18.2-
51.2254 means the "inability to do substantially all of the material
acts necessary to the prosecution of any occupation for remunera-
tion or profit in substantially the customary and usual manner in
which such occupation is prosecuted. ' 255 The word "testimony"
used in the perjury provision of the Code of Virginia256 "encom-
passes any material declaration made under oath, whether ex parte
or in an adversary proceeding subject to cross-examination. 2 57
In an abusive language case alleging a violation of Code of Vir-
ginia section 18.2-416,258 the evidence was insufficient where the
parties were not close enough, separated by fifty-five to sixty feet
for the encounter to be "face-to-face. '259 The evidence was suffi-
cient to prove the offense of possession of a sawed-off shotgun in
violation of Code of Virginia section 18.2-299, even though it was
inoperable, missing a firing pin.260
A defendant's unrebutted evidence that he was incarcerated in
another state required reversal of his conviction for failure to ap-
pear for court.261 In other cases, the evidence was sufficient to
prove guilt of obstruction of justice,262 escape,263 and contempt.26
IX. CONCLUSION
To the studious litigant, the 1992 opinions of the Virginia Court
of Appeals offer many and varied lessons in trial and appellate ad-
253. Id.
254. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-51.2 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
255. Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 840, 419 S.E.2d 422, 425 (1992).
256. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-435 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
257. Scott v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 294, 298, 416 S.E.2d 47, 49 (1992).
258. V&. CODE ANN. § 18.2-416 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
259. Hershfield v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 381, 385, 417 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1992).
260. Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 776, 418 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1992) (the
court of appeals found that the gun could be made to fire by inserting a small pin or nail
without requiring any specific expertise).
261. Riley v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 494, 412 S.E.2d 724 (1992).
262. Woodson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 787, 795-96, 421 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1992).
263. Mabe v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 439, 417 S.E.2d 899 (1992).
264. Baugh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368, 417 S.E.2d 891 (1992).
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vocacy. The dedication of this court to an increasingly thorough
and reasoned analysis of the myriad of issues accepted for appel-
late review is tremendously helpful to the practitioner, and is to be
commended. Of like benefit is the increasing availability of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia as the court of last resort.
